Keenan 411

Who Needs Data, I Already Know

Yesterday my New England Patriots beat up the NY Jets. Thank God, because it put to rest all the noise around Bill Belichick’s 4th and 2 decision. During the Colts game last week, Bill Belichick went for it on 4th and 2 from his own 28 yard line, leading by only 6 points. The attempt failed. The Colts took over from their 28 yard line and scored 4 plays later. The Pats lost.

Did Bill make a bad decision?

Data and the facts are an interesting thing. We love their objectivity. We hate it when it doesn’t fit our own interpretation of things. The Monday morning quarterbacking of Belichick’s decision last week is the perfect example. Most fans, and observers, say it was a STUPID move that cost the Patriots the game.

I say, let’s look at the data, courtesy of an I-Phone camera, ESPN and a Cal Berkley Economics Professor. (I took these pictures of an ESPN story explaining the math behind the decision)

According to a Cal Berkley Economics Professor, if the Patriots had punted the ball, their chances of winning was 70%. Pats Punt

By going for it on 4th and 2, their chances of converting was 60% goingforit

By not converting, they had a 49% chance of stopping Manning and the Colts from scoring. chance of stopping colts

When you finish tabulating the math and combine the probability of stopping Manning on a failed attempt with the probability of making the first down, against punting and stopping Manning from scoring, the decision with the HIGHEST probability of winning was going for it, with a 79% chance of winning vs a 70% chance of winning by punting. Patswin

Bill made the right call, regardless of the end result.

The problem with data is far too often it doesn’t fit with the simplicity of our noggins. We can’t think that complex. We need to dumb things down so we can make sense of them. By punting the ball, everything that happens after, to our little brains, is unrelated to the decision to punt. Win or lose, the end result isn’t connected to the punt decision. However, when Bill chose to go for it, by not making it, everything after that decision was a direct result of going for it an not making it. Our head tells us that the safest bet, the best decision to win the game is to punt the ball. But that’s not true. It was to go for it.

Do you always listen to the data? Or, do you listen to the data when it fits your noggins interpretation of things. Cause that’s the easy and what most people do.

Data is phenomenal, it tells you exactly what you need to know. The problem is it doesn’t tell you exactly what you want to hear and that is the problem for most people. They don’t like hearing something different from what they already know or want to be true.

How do you read the data?

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View Comments

  1. 1

    Jim,

    I think you data and conclusions are right, but many will not believe you mostly for the reasons you state. But if you can get past the emotion, your posting can help a lot of sales folks to do more.

    Tibor

    Comment by Renbor — November 24, 2009 @ 9:50 am

  2. 2

    Jim,

    I think you hit it on the head–the data often too complex. And our mental short-cuts often take us into the easy solution or the one most familiar, not necessarily the most probable to yield success.

    Time to make it a little easier to get and process that data I think…where are those sales performance numbers???

    Comment by Bill Rice — November 24, 2009 @ 12:37 pm

  3. 3

    It all depends on what data was used to get these numbers. How was the 60% chance of converting arrived at? Was it based on the Patriots past conversion rates? How about factoring in how often the Colts stop 4th and 2. And what about injuries. The Patriot may be better converting 4th and 2 when they have a full squad including Fred Taylor and Sammy Morris. They did not play. So stats do tell you something, but it is quite often what is happening in the moment that is most important.

    Comment by Jeff — November 24, 2009 @ 2:36 pm

  4. 4

    Good question Jeff, I don't know if these specific to the Pats and the
    moment, or broader against an entire season. Also, don't know how you
    can build for probability against a particular person or persons.

    Do you agree with the decision?

    Comment by Keenan — November 24, 2009 @ 2:45 pm

  5. 5

    emotion and the desire to be right are strong motivators, they get
    sales people everyday

    Comment by Keenan — November 24, 2009 @ 2:50 pm

  6. 6

    Jim,
    Its tough to say whether I agree with the decision now that the play has happened. I didn't see it live. But I get why he did it. Gain 2 yards and the game is over. However, the downside of failure was so large (Manning with the ball at the 30) that I lean towards disagreeing with the decision to go for it. I also think the play call was incorrect. If you're going to go for it, the pattern has to go across the first down marker, not right at it.

    Comment by Jeff — November 25, 2009 @ 10:15 am

  7. 7

    “However, the downside of failure was so large. . . ”

    This is exactly why I wrote the post. Like your assessment, most people evaluate the decision on “IF” you don't get it. But you can't do that. You have to factor in the probability of going for it AND stopping them. You can't, not factor in the probability of getting it with the probability of stopping them should you not converting. When you do that, their is a higher probability of winning vs punting and stopping them.

    Our humanity and emotions break it down differently and therefore give us a false sense of reality and truth. It's a good discussion

    Comment by Keenan — November 25, 2009 @ 10:41 am

  8. 8

    Jim,
    Its tough to say whether I agree with the decision now that the play has happened. I didn't see it live. But I get why he did it. Gain 2 yards and the game is over. However, the downside of failure was so large (Manning with the ball at the 30) that I lean towards disagreeing with the decision to go for it. I also think the play call was incorrect. If you're going to go for it, the pattern has to go across the first down marker, not right at it.

    Comment by Jeff — November 25, 2009 @ 5:15 pm

  9. 9

    “However, the downside of failure was so large. . . ”

    This is exactly why I wrote the post. Like your assessment, most people evaluate the decision on “IF” you don't get it. But you can't do that. You have to factor in the probability of going for it AND stopping them. You can't, not factor in the probability of getting it with the probability of stopping them should you not converting. When you do that, their is a higher probability of winning vs punting and stopping them.

    Our humanity and emotions break it down differently and therefore give us a false sense of reality and truth. It's a good discussion

    Comment by Keenan — November 25, 2009 @ 5:41 pm

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